Göring in conference following the previous day’s losses. German effort to be switched against Fighter Command. Only minor air activity.
Night: Continuous attacks against London. Smaller raids on Merseyside and the Midlands.
Weather: General rain and cloud.
Enemy Action by Day
The morning of 16 September brought sober reflection on both sides of the Channel. In Britain, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park, commander of No. 11 Group, began the day with a critical evaluation of the previous day’s air combat. While the results of 15 September had been momentous—with RAF squadrons successfully repelling two major Luftwaffe raids on London—Park remained cautious. He expressed concern over poor coordination between squadrons during interception. Some RAF units had failed to rendezvous at designated vector points on time, while others had climbed too early and engaged from low altitudes, undermining the defensive strategy. Despite this, morale across Fighter Command had surged. The events of the previous day had demonstrated not only that Fighter Command remained intact, but also that it could still mass large, coordinated forces and deliver telling blows to the German bomber stream.
Across the Channel, Hermann Göring convened his Luftflotten commanders for a high-level review of the battle. Hitler was reportedly furious at the results of the 15 September attack. His expectation that London would be reduced to rubble had not been realized, and the Luftwaffe had suffered its heaviest losses since 18 August. The capital remained standing, and Fighter Command, contrary to German intelligence, had met the Luftwaffe in superior numbers. Göring acknowledged the evident failure of shifting the focus from RAF airfields to London. His commanders admitted that the RAF was not broken and that morale among German bomber crews had begun to falter. Göring’s decision was clear: further daylight bombing of London was to be abandoned. Instead, the Luftwaffe would resume its campaign against Fighter Command’s airfields and aircraft production infrastructure. To satisfy Hitler’s desire to continue striking the capital, Göring promised an intensification of night bombing—believing, mistakenly, that the RAF had no answer to nocturnal attacks.
Enemy Action by Day
Although widespread rain and low cloud covered much of southern England, early radar plots indicated that the Luftwaffe still intended to test British defenses. At approximately 07:30, a mass of around 350 enemy aircraft began forming over the Pas-de-Calais. Several waves crossed the Kent coastline between 07:35 and 08:05, spreading out from Dover to Rye and as far north as the Isle of Sheppey. One element pushed into Essex, seemingly heading towards the capital. However, by 08:32, the entire force had turned back and exited British airspace. Despite the poor weather, Fighter Command had scrambled 21 squadrons in response. It is likely that the size and speed of the RAF response dissuaded the Luftwaffe from pressing home the attack. No engagement occurred, but the rapid mobilisation of Fighter Command again demonstrated the resilience of the integrated air defense system.
Combat Engagement Over Essex
Over 100 aircraft—primarily Bf 109s from JG 51—took part in a high-speed fighter sweep across the Thames Estuary as part of the early raid. Their objective was unclear—possibly a probe for vulnerable targets or an attempt to lure RAF fighters into combat. Hurricanes of No. 605 Squadron, operating from Croydon, was scrambled to intercept the intruders. Although most of the German fighters turned back before contact, a skirmish did develop near the Essex coast. Major Werner Mölders, Kommodore of JG 51, engaged and damaged a Hurricane piloted by Pilot Officer E.J. Watson. Watson was forced to make an emergency landing at RAF Detling. The incident marked Mölders’ thirty-eighth confirmed aerial victory. No. 605 Squadron reported damaging at least two enemy fighters, though no German losses were confirmed in this particular engagement.
Interceptions Over East Anglia
Shortly after 09:00, a lone Ju 88 reconnaissance bomber was tracked flying off the coast of Norfolk, heading south toward the Wash. RAF response was immediate. Hurricanes from No. 257 Squadron at Martlesham Heath were vectored to intercept, along with Spitfires of No. 616 Squadron from Kirton-in-Lindsey. The Ju 88 was spotted and engaged by Sgt. T.C. Iveson of No. 616 Squadron. He managed to score hits on the German bomber but was forced to break off the pursuit when his aircraft ran critically low on fuel. Approximately 20 miles north of Cromer, Sgt. Iveson was forced to ditch his Spitfire (L1036) in the North Sea. Fortunately, he was rescued by a Royal Navy motor torpedo boat and taken safely to Great Yarmouth. The German bomber escaped, likely damaged but intact.
While RAF squadrons managed their response to the fragmented raids, logistical problems were becoming increasingly evident within the Luftwaffe. In the morning, Hauptmann Erich von Selle’s II./JG 3 was despatched as part of a bomber escort mission but lost contact with the formation in heavy cloud. Despite multiple weather reports suggesting clear skies, cloud cover disrupted rendezvous procedures. Upon return to their airfields in France, eight of the eighteen Bf 109s landed with empty fuel tanks, narrowly avoiding forced landings. When ordered to undertake a second escort mission only two hours later, von Selle refused. Citing that his Gruppe was already understrength by twenty-two aircraft and that further losses would render the unit inoperable, he warned that if forced into the air again, he would order his pilots to bail out rather than waste aircraft. The refusal appears to have been heeded, and the unit received no further orders for the day—an indication of increasing operational strain across the Jagdwaffe.
Sporadic Activity Across the British Coastline
Elsewhere along the British coast, scattered Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights continued throughout the morning and afternoon. One raid appeared off Fifeness in eastern Scotland and flew south across Amble, tracking inland toward Carlisle and Cockermouth before returning by the same route. A second reconnaissance Ju 88 was observed off Cromer and briefly engaged by RAF fighters without result. Along the south coast, German aircraft crossed near the Needles and flew on diverging tracks—one northeasterly toward Northolt, Duxford, and Debden, the other northwesterly to Middle Wallop and Cheltenham. Between 17:00 and 20:00, radar plotted approximately fifteen small raids in the Isle of Wight area. These were believed to be the lead elements of the Luftwaffe’s night bombing force probing British defenses.
Patrols Without Contact and Unconfirmed Claims
RAF patrols remained active despite the lack of major attacks. Hurricanes from Nos. 73, 257, and 504 Squadrons were sent to patrol the North Kent area, particularly around Gravesend, but no contact was made. Official records indicate that only two squadrons undertook operational combat sorties during the day, yet German losses amounted to ten aircraft—including one He 111, two He 115 floatplanes, and seven Ju 88s. Only three Luftwaffe aerial victories were credited to German fighter pilots, including one each to Mölders, Uffz. August Dilling of 6./JG 3, and Oblt. Georg Claus of Stab./JG 51. RAF claims were difficult to verify; some German losses likely occurred due to weather, fuel shortage, or anti-aircraft fire.
Enemy Action by Night
As daylight faded, the Luftwaffe initiated what would become one of the most sustained and destructive night raids of the campaign so far. At approximately 19:40, radar plots indicated the first hostile formations leaving their bases in the Cherbourg and Le Havre regions. These were soon followed by a steady stream of bombers departing from the Dieppe area. The initial routes took the formations across the Channel between the Isle of Wight and Dover. Once over the coast, the bombers fanned out in multiple directions. Several formations turned northwest into the Bristol Channel and then fanned across South Wales, the Midlands, and North Wales. Others pushed northeast into Essex and the Thames Estuary, flying directly toward the capital.
The primary target, once again, was London. However, unlike previous night raids, the scale of the attack was more deliberate and methodically staggered. The first phase culminated at 23:50, by which time concentrated bombing over East Anglia, the Thames Estuary, and Greater London had inflicted widespread damage. At 00:20, a second wave emerged from the Dutch coastal islands and crossed the East Anglian coastline, several formations reaching London by 01:00. Others turned inland toward the Midlands. By approximately 02:42, the bulk of the formations had turned back across the Channel, leaving behind a trail of damage, fires, and casualties.
The intensity of the raids caught many districts off guard. London sustained heavy bombing in multiple boroughs. At Thameshaven, an oil wharf was struck by a combination of high explosive and incendiary bombs around 21:04. Two storage tanks were engulfed in flames. In Hackney, at 23:00, bombs struck the LMS signal box near Victoria Park, halting all rail traffic through the area. Additional damage was recorded at the Homerton railway bridge, where structural supports were destroyed. At 23:40, East Ferry Crane and Engineering Company in Poplar suffered significant damage, reducing production capacity. In Southwark, a direct hit on the Southern Railway Arch at Guildford Street junction severed critical infrastructure.
In St. Pancras, the reception ward of the local hospital was demolished by high explosives shortly after midnight. Miraculously, no casualties were reported, though a number of unexploded bombs were left buried beneath rubble and rendered the building unsafe. The volume of fires across the capital was unprecedented. Thirty-pump fires were reported at Ordell Street in Bow, Old Bond Street, and Great Portland Street. The largest incidents included an eighty-pump fire at West Smithfield, fifty pumps deployed to Bermondsey, and forty to Clerkenwell. Fires were also recorded at Farringdon Street Station, Eastcheap, Tower Hill, and Old Broad Street. Despite these attacks, vital command and government buildings remained untouched.
At approximately 03:30, a renewed wave of raids began as fresh formations were plotted leaving both the Dieppe and Ostend areas. These raids were less concentrated than the earlier ones and likely comprised both high-level bombers and minelayers. The formations from Dieppe headed straight for London, while those from Ostend appeared to target the East Coast. Evidence suggests that many aircraft from this phase were tasked with minelaying along shipping lanes off East Anglia and the Humber Estuary. Others dropped their payloads over East London and the Thames riverbank, triggering further fires and confusion. By 05:30, the last bombers had cleared British airspace.
Among the confirmed attacks in the latter phase was the bombing of Hampstead Norris airfield at 17:50, RAF Honington at 15:50, and Yatesbury at approximately 03:00. None of these attacks caused significant structural damage or casualties, though in several cases unexploded ordnance delayed operations. At RAF Woodley, an unexploded bomb forced the suspension of production at the Philips and Powis aircraft manufacturing plant. Speke airfield near Liverpool came under attack before noon, though no fatalities were recorded. Other airfields targeted during the night included Alconbury (12:35), Feltwell, Oulton (16:30), and Henlow (14:00). Most of the damage was limited to cratering and minor structural disruption.
Outside of London, the night brought widespread, if uneven, bombing across the country. At 23:45, high explosive and incendiary bombs fell on the northern districts of Coventry, causing extensive damage to residential streets. Casualty numbers remained uncertain by morning, though the destruction to working-class homes was evident. In Newport, Monmouthshire, bombs fell near the docks and a coal hoist at 21:43, causing only minor disruption to operations. In Birmingham, bombs struck the Kingsheath and Hall Green districts at 23:00, destroying multiple houses and resulting in ten confirmed casualties.
In Newcastle, bombs were reported over the Gosforth, Heaton, and Hebburn districts at 20:06. While several properties were damaged and fires broke out in multiple locations, no serious casualties occurred. In Wakefield, a bomb strike around 20:00 started fires at both the city prison and the Williams and Womersley engineering works. Neither facility reported major interruptions to function. In Skinningrove, two high explosive bombs dropped near the ironworks at 16:10 caused damage to electrical power lines and water mains, although iron production was not materially affected.
Individual Incidents and Pirateneinsatze Raids
Two Heinkel He 115 floatplanes from Seenotflugkdo 3/506 were involved in torpedo attacks on coastal shipping. One aircraft was damaged by anti-aircraft fire while attempting a low-level run on a convoy off the Northumberland coast. At 15:00, the aircraft was forced to ditch seven miles offshore near Alnwick. The crew abandoned the aircraft and were rescued from their dinghy by a local fishing boat, which towed the overturned floatplane to Eyemouth Harbour. The crew survived uninjured, though the aircraft was declared a total loss. The fishermen, perhaps expecting salvage rights or compensation, received only the remaining fuel and parachute silk as reward.
That night also witnessed the first of the so-called “Pirateneinsätze” or “pirate raids”—lone bomber missions carried out under the cover of darkness. A solitary Heinkel He 111 from I./KG 55 targeted the Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton but aborted the mission and returned to Dreux without releasing its payload. Other lone bombers met with more success. He 111s from I./KG 27 dropped bombs over central London shortly after 21:00, causing widespread damage in East Ham, West Ham, and Bethnal Green. Another bomber from the same unit released its load over the city of Bath. These unscheduled, low-level incursions allowed the Luftwaffe to bypass standard defenses, though the damage was typically less focused than mass raids.
The Changing Pattern of Civilian Life
By mid-September, nightly raids had become an expected part of life in many British cities. In London, the public’s response was increasingly structured and communal. Tens of thousands of civilians descended into Underground stations by nightfall, turning platforms into makeshift dormitories. Bunks and mattresses were installed, tea and food provided by voluntary aid groups, and even musical performances and impromptu concerts held to maintain morale. Many families adopted the evening shelter ritual as routine. In towns without underground systems, civilians relied on Anderson shelters or public bunkers, often under cold, damp, and crowded conditions. Though the Blitz was still in its early weeks, a new way of life had already taken root—one shaped by the need for endurance and community in the face of nightly terror.
Final Losses and Strategic Implications
The night of 16–17 September marked a strategic transition. The Luftwaffe’s shift to night bombing was no longer a tactical supplement—it was now the main axis of attack. The Luftwaffe had lost at least eighteen aircraft during the full 24-hour period, including ten during daylight operations. Fighter Command suffered only five aircraft damaged or destroyed, with one pilot wounded. The comparative imbalance in losses reflected the decreasing risk faced by the Luftwaffe at night, as Britain still lacked an effective night fighter force. Yet the shift also reflected operational necessity: daylight raids were proving too costly, and the German high command was becoming increasingly aware that the battle for air supremacy over Britain was slipping from its grasp.
German Losses:
Airmen: 14 | Aircraft: 10
British Losses:
Airmen: 0 | Aircraft: 1
Photo Descriptions
- The remains of a Messerschmitt Bf 109E-3 of I/JG 52 being transported on the back of a civilian lorry, September 1940. Note the I Gruppe ‘running boar’ insignia on the cowling. © IWM (HU 73750)
- A Spitfire of No. 19 Squadron is refuelled at Fowlmere, near Duxford, September 1940. © IWM (CH 1372)
- Flight Sergeant Unwin, Flight Lieutenant Lawson and Sergeant Lloyd of No. 19 Squadron at Fowlmere, September 1940. © IWM (CH 1368)
- The Intelligence Officer of No. 19 Squadron RAF (back to the camera) receives pilots’ accounts of a sortie at Fowlmere, Cambridgeshire. The pilots are (left to right): Squadron Leader B J E ‘Sandy’ Lane (Squadron Commanding Officer), Flight-Lieutenant W J ‘Farmer’ Lawson and Sergeant D Lloyd. © IWM (CH 1371)
- Squadron Leader Brian ‘Sandy’ Lane, CO of No. 19 Squadron (centre) confers with Flight Lieutenant Walter ‘Farmer’ Lawson and Flight Sergeant George ‘Grumpy Unwin at Fowlmere near Duxford, September 1940. © IWM (CH 1366)