Very little activity.
Weather: Fog in France, the Straits and south-east England.
Enemy Action by Day
Operations on 16 July 1940 were heavily constrained by persistent fog over northern France, the Straits of Dover, and south-east England. The poor visibility delayed and restricted Luftwaffe activity for much of the day, resulting in one of the quieter periods since the opening of the Battle of Britain. Air operations were largely limited to reconnaissance, scattered shipping probes, and isolated engagements rather than coordinated offensive action.
The day was nonetheless significant at the strategic level. On this date, Hitler issued Directive No. 16, formally ordering preparations for the invasion of Britain under the code name Seelöwe. The directive envisaged a surprise landing on a broad front from Ramsgate to west of the Isle of Wight and made clear that the operation was dependent upon the elimination of the Royal Air Force, the clearing and protection of sea routes, and the domination of coastal waters by mines and artillery. Despite this declaration of intent, the day’s air activity bore little resemblance to a decisive opening phase.
South-Eastern Channel and East Coast
Early in the morning, Luftwaffe fighter activity resulted in losses to RAF Blenheims operating over the Continent. At 06:15 hours, a Blenheim was claimed by Fw Georg Kiening of 6./JG 54, followed at 06:50 by a second claim near Bruges. These aircraft belonged to No. 18 Squadron; one crashed into the sea off Bruges with all crew killed, while the second force-landed on its return flight.
Further north, enemy bomber activity developed off the Scottish coast. During the afternoon, Spitfires of No. 603 Squadron intercepted and shot down a Heinkel He 111 of 9./KG 26 north-east of Fraserburgh. The aircraft crashed into the North Sea. Two members of the crew survived, including the pilot, Oberleutnant Gerhard Lorenz, who was taken prisoner. Before the aircraft was destroyed, its gunner succeeded in damaging one of the attacking Spitfires, which nevertheless returned safely to base.
Between 15:24 and 16:46 hours, No. 603 Squadron maintained patrols in the same area, but no further claims were recorded.
Coastal Command Engagements and Operational Losses
Coastal Command aircraft were active later in the day over the North Sea. Two separate engagements occurred during the evening involving Dornier Do 18 flying boats of 2./KüFlGr. 406. At 19:50 hours, one Do 18 was shot down by a Hudson of No. 233 Squadron approximately seventy miles north-west of Kinnaird’s Head. The aircraft ditched, and its crew was later rescued by another Do 18 at dawn the following day, after which the damaged flying boat was scuttled.
Approximately forty minutes later, a second Do 18 was engaged by a Hudson of No. 224 Squadron some one hundred miles south-west of Stavanger. The German aircraft returned to base with damage but no casualties.
Elsewhere, Army Co-operation Command suffered two fatal losses as a result of the prevailing weather. A Lysander of No. 4 Squadron crashed into high ground near East Barnby, north of Whitby, during a coastal reconnaissance sortie, killing both pilot and gunner. A second Lysander came down near Scarborough following engine failure; the pilot was injured but survived.
South-Western Channel and South Coast
Fog over northern France and south-east England delayed Luftwaffe operations in the south until mid-afternoon. When conditions improved, Ju 88 bombers of 6./KG 54 attacked Lee-on-Solent, destroying a Royal Navy DH86 aircraft on the ground.
The raid was intercepted by Hurricanes of No. 601 Squadron operating off the Isle of Wight. One Ju 88 was shot down into the Solent off St Catherine’s Point and was confirmed destroyed. Two members of its crew were rescued and taken prisoner. A second Ju 88 was claimed by RAF pilots but was not confirmed as lost. During the engagement, one Hurricane pilot remained on scene to guide a nearby tug toward the survivors’ dinghy until they were recovered.
Between 16:40 and 18:04 hours, No. 601 Squadron maintained patrols off the Needles, but no further enemy aircraft were intercepted.
Naval Operations
German naval activity during the night of 15–16 July was similarly affected by weather. A sweep by S-boats in the Channel produced no results. One torpedo fired at a patrol vessel missed its target, and further operations were curtailed by poor conditions.
Summary
Despite the formal issuance of Directive No. 16 and the declaration of intent to prepare for the invasion of Britain, air operations on 16 July 1940 were dominated by weather limitations rather than strategic momentum. Luftwaffe activity remained fragmented and opportunistic, consisting primarily of reconnaissance flights, limited bomber raids, and fighter engagements over the Channel and North Sea. RAF losses were sustained largely through isolated encounters and operational accidents rather than sustained pressure. The day closed without any meaningful degradation of Fighter Command, underscoring the gap between German strategic ambition and the practical realities of air operations during this early phase of the battle.
Enemy Action by Night
Fog continued into the night, further limiting Luftwaffe operations. Nevertheless, several red warnings were issued across northern cities, including Dundee, Middlesbrough, Hull, and Grimsby. Between 23:00 and 02:00 hours, a small number of raids were plotted over Duncansby Head, Aberdeen, and along the coastline between Newcastle and the Humber.
The majority of these aircraft appeared to be engaged in minelaying operations, with several paths indicating deliberate loitering over coastal waters. One aircraft was initially misidentified as friendly after transmitting a correct signal over the Humber, but later analysis confirmed it was hostile after it turned back east towards Germany.
Reports also suggested that magnetic mines may have been dropped near Silloth at 01:27 hours. In Orkney, aircraft were heard overhead around 23:56 hours, but no bombs were dropped.
Hitler’s Directive No. 16: The Invasion of Britain
While the skies over Britain remained relatively quiet, a pivotal development was unfolding on the German side. On 16 July 1940, Adolf Hitler issued Directive No. 16, formally ordering preparations for an invasion of Great Britain. Codenamed Operation Seelöwe (Sea Lion), the directive called for a surprise crossing and wide-front landing between Ramsgate and the Isle of Wight, contingent upon neutralising the RAF and securing air superiority.
The Luftwaffe’s role would be critical: not only was it to eliminate RAF Fighter Command and its infrastructure, but it was also tasked with supporting the invasion by attacking British strongpoints, ports, naval forces, and troop concentrations. Hitler stressed that terror bombing would be reserved as a retaliatory measure, not a first strike. Preparations were to be completed by mid-August, with intensification of the air war to begin no earlier than 5 August, depending on weather and readiness.
Oberst Beppo Schmid’s intelligence assessment, Studie Blau, submitted on the same day, downplayed British radar and Fighter Command’s defensive capabilities—an underestimation that would soon prove to be one of the great miscalculations of the campaign.
German Losses:
Airmen: 4 | Aircraft: 4
British Losses:
Airmen: 1 | Aircraft: 1
Hurricane P2995, No. 249 Squadron. Aircraft destroyed.
Sgt A.D.W. Main killed. Engine cut out during take off from base airfield.
http://www.bbm.org.uk/airmen/MainADW.htm
Photo Descriptions
- Rearming a No. 601 Squadron Hawker Hurricane at RAF Tangmere, 1940.
- A formation of Junkers Ju 88A-1 bombers.