This section highlights the key Luftwaffe officers responsible for planning and executing the German air campaign against Britain in 1940. From Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring to the commanders of Luftflotten, these leaders shaped the strategy and tactics of the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain.

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, Commander in Chief

Hermann Göring embarked on his military career by enlisting as an infantryman in 1912. He served the initial part of the First World War in the trenches, earning numerous distinctions for his bravery. However, life in the trenches was made even more challenging by his battle with arthritis. This ailment prompted him to seek a transfer to the Air Service, although his first attempt was met with rejection due to low test scores. Fortunately, an old friend in the Service, Bruno Loerzer, recognized Göring’s exceptional piloting abilities and lent his support for Göring’s second attempt. By the war’s end, Göring was at the helm of the Richthofen Jasta, flying an all-white Fokker D.7 and claiming credit for downing 22 enemy aircraft.

The aftermath of the war in Germany, marked by depression and social unrest, influenced Göring in two significant ways. Firstly, he became an ardent anti-communist in his political stance. Secondly, he increasingly embraced the ideology of the rapidly emerging Nazi party as the purported solution to Germany’s woes. Göring participated in the infamous “Beer Hall Putsch” of 1923 and became a staunch ally and supporter of Adolf Hitler. As Hitler rose to power, Göring’s fortunes improved, and he assumed responsibility for establishing the Gestapo. Due to his distinguished wartime record, he was entrusted with the task of building a modern air force, the Luftwaffe. These appointments granted Göring extensive and far-reaching political authority within the Nazi hierarchy, a situation that would ultimately lead to his downfall.

Göring misused the powers granted to him, appropriating large estates and other symbols of status and wealth while neglecting his military duties. This left the fledgling Luftwaffe leaderless at a critical juncture. Notably, his pivotal decision to shift the focus of air raids from enemy airfields to cities during the Battle of Britain is widely considered a major blunder that cost the Luftwaffe the battle, if not ultimately the war.

This error foreshadowed Göring’s overall leadership style during his tenure as the head of the Luftwaffe. He frequently disregarded the counsel of his field commanders, engaging in lengthy and futile discussions on minor matters, often resulting in the neglect and delay of crucial decisions. This severely impacted the Luftwaffe’s ability to conduct the war effectively, despite the remarkable technological advancements in the German aviation industry during that period.

In 1945, Göring was captured by the Allies and subsequently put on trial as a war criminal. He was sentenced to death but chose to take cyanide and died in his prison cell.

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, Commander Luftflotte II

Albert Kesselring, a Bavarian native, initially served in the artillery during the First World War as part of the forces under the command of Prince Ruprecht. He ventured into aviation relatively late in his career, transferring to the Luftwaffe in 1933. However, he swiftly established himself as a capable leader and a skilled politician, with the latter attribute being particularly crucial for survival and advancement within the new German military under the Nazi party.

At the outset of the Second World War, Kesselring assumed command of the Luftflotte (Air Fleet) tasked with supporting the German Army during the invasion of Poland. Following the successful conclusion of this campaign, as well as the Norwegian and Low Countries campaigns, he was entrusted with command of the northern Luftflotte, Luftflotte II, which was larger than the southern counterpart, Luftflotte III. This assignment, in close proximity to Britain, reflected the high regard for Kesselring’s leadership abilities.

Despite the Luftwaffe’s failure to secure air superiority over the English Channel, Kesselring’s career suffered little from this setback, a testament to his political astuteness. In 1941, he was dispatched to oversee the air forces in North Africa, where he and Erwin Rommel were responsible for nearly defeating the Allies over the next two years before being compelled to retreat to Italy. It was in Italy, from 1943 onward, that Kesselring’s talents as a commander truly shone. Assuming overall command of both air and ground forces, he executed a remarkable campaign despite challenges such as scarce supplies and communication difficulties, causing a delay of more than a year to the Allied advance.

Much like Göring, Kesselring faced a trial at the end of the war, accused of atrocities against Italian hostages. These charges generated controversy, as they seemed incongruous with the character of a disciplined military commander like him. Although initially sentenced to death, his sentence was subsequently reduced to five years of imprisonment, and Kesselring was eventually released in 1952.

Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, Commander Luftflotte III

Hugo Sperrle, commanding the comparatively smaller Luftflotte III, achieved his greatest recognition prior to the outbreak of the Second World War when he was appointed to lead the infamous Legion Condor during the Spanish Civil War. A veteran of the First World War, Sperrle’s rapid ascent within the Nazi hierarchy owed much to his strict adherence to orders and his outspoken support of Göring over Erhard Milch. While he may have been perceived as a commander lacking imagination and flexibility due to his unwavering commitment to orders, Sperrle’s career underscores his survival within a system that did not typically reward individual initiative.

It is worth noting that Sperrle stood out as the sole individual who recognized and vocalized opposition to Göring’s decision to shift target priorities during the Battle of Britain, from attacking Fighter Command airfields to targeting cities and other strategic objectives. He correctly pointed out that the Royal Air Force had not been defeated and could rebuild and enhance its effectiveness if given a respite from attacks on its airfields. Unfortunately, his counsel fell on deaf ears, highlighting Sperrle’s genuine abilities as a commander, rather than the perception often shaped by his survival instincts.

However, it is important to acknowledge that Sperrle shared some of the same excesses as his superior. Not only did he bear a physical resemblance to Göring, but he also indulged in similar luxuries, commandeering opulent headquarters and private residences. Additionally, he fully enjoyed the gambling and other amenities offered by the territories conquered by Nazi forces.

Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, Commander Luftflotte V

Hans-Jürgen Stumpff was born in 1889 into a Prussian military family and entered the Imperial German Army in 1907, following the traditional path of a professional officer. During the First World War he initially served as an infantry officer before being selected for the Army General Staff, where he gained experience in operational planning and higher command work. This staff background, rather than frontline aviation experience, would define the course of his later career.

After the war, Stumpff remained in the drastically reduced Reichswehr, one of the limited cadre of officers retained under the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. He continued to serve in staff and command appointments throughout the interwar period. In 1933, following the Nazi seizure of power and the early re-establishment of German air power, he transferred from the Army to the emerging Luftwaffe, bringing with him a solid grounding in General Staff procedures rather than operational flying credentials.

From June 1937 to January 1939, Stumpff served as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, a position that placed him at the center of the air force’s rapid expansion and doctrinal development. By the outbreak of the Second World War he had already left this post, as responsibility for operational planning passed to his successor, Hans Jeschonnek. Stumpff’s own career thereafter shifted away from central planning toward operational command.

In early 1940, Stumpff was given an operational appointment, briefly commanding Luftflotte 1, based in northern Germany and Poland. In May 1940 he assumed command of the newly formed Luftflotte 5, responsible for air operations from bases in Norway and Denmark. During the Battle of Britain, Luftflotte 5 was tasked with attacking targets in northern England. The major assault of 15 August 1940 ended disastrously, with heavy losses inflicted by RAF Fighter Command. Following this failure, Stumpff’s forces played little further role in the campaign, their geographical isolation and limited resources making sustained offensive operations impractical.

Stumpff remained in command of Luftflotte 5 until the end of 1943, overseeing largely defensive operations in Scandinavia. In early 1944, he was appointed commander of Luftflotte Reich, charged with the defense of Germany against the intensifying American daylight bombing offensive. Tasked with opposing vastly superior Allied forces while suffering from chronic shortages of aircraft, fuel, and trained aircrew, his command was unable to stem the destruction of the Reich, a failure that reflected material realities rather than personal incompetence.

At the end of the war, Stumpff represented the Luftwaffe at Germany’s unconditional surrender. He signed the surrender instrument at Reims on 7 May 1945 as the Luftwaffe’s representative and was again present in Berlin on 8 May for the formal ratification before the Allied powers. Unlike several senior Luftwaffe figures, Stumpff was not prosecuted for war crimes. He spent several years in Allied captivity before being released in the late 1940s and lived quietly thereafter until his death in 1968.

Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek

Hans Jeschonnek was born in 1899 into a Prussian military family and entered the Imperial German Army in 1914 at the outbreak of the First World War. Initially serving as an infantryman, he transferred in 1917 to the Luftstreitkräfte, the Imperial German Army Flying Service, where he became a fighter pilot. Although his wartime flying career was relatively brief, it gave him an enduring identification with air power that shaped his later outlook.

After the Armistice, Jeschonnek remained in the Reichswehr, serving as a cavalry officer during the interwar years. Like many officers of his generation, he adapted to the constraints imposed by the Treaty of Versailles while quietly preparing for Germany’s eventual rearmament. In 1933, following the Nazi seizure of power and the emergence of German air forces, he transferred to the Luftwaffe, where his intelligence, energy, and political reliability quickly set him apart.

The next six years saw a meteoric rise. Jeschonnek advanced rapidly through the Luftwaffe’s staff structure, benefiting from both his operational background and his close alignment with Hermann Göring and Adolf Hitler. On 1 February 1939, at just thirty-nine years of age, he was appointed Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, a position he would hold continuously until his death. Throughout this entire period, he was the dominant figure in Luftwaffe operational planning and strategic advice.

As Chief of the General Staff, Jeschonnek was an enthusiastic proponent of the dive bomber and the concept of short, decisive air campaigns. This outlook contributed to early successes in Poland and France, where the Luftwaffe appeared all-conquering. Beneath the surface, however, the force suffered from serious deficiencies in aircraft development, logistics, and long-term planning. Jeschonnek consistently underestimated the importance of technological advances such as long-range fighters, heavy bombers, and radar-directed air defense, and he failed to correct systemic weaknesses in production and supply. These shortcomings became starkly apparent during the Battle of Britain and were further exposed during the protracted campaigns in Russia and the Mediterranean.

During the years of German success, Jeschonnek enjoyed Hitler’s confidence and was widely regarded as one of the Luftwaffe’s brightest figures. As the war turned against Germany, however, his position deteriorated rapidly. He fell out of favor with both Hitler and Göring, while his unwavering loyalty to Hitler isolated him further within the Luftwaffe leadership, where he had accumulated numerous enemies. By 1943, burdened by responsibility, strategic failure, and personal isolation, he was suffering from severe depression.

On 19 August 1943, following the devastating Allied bombing of Peenemünde and amid growing criticism of the Luftwaffe’s inability to defend the Reich, Hans Jeschonnek took his own life by shooting himself at Hitler’s headquarters. His death marked the abrupt end of a career that had risen with extraordinary speed and collapsed under the weight of strategic misjudgment, political dependency, and a war that long outgrew the assumptions on which the Luftwaffe had been built.